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Inventing Paradigms, Monopoly, Methodology, and Mythology at 'Chicago': Nutter and Stigler1 
 
Introduction & Summary 
 
This paper focuses on Warren Nutter’s The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 
1899-1939. 2 This started out as a (1949) doctoral dissertation at The University of Chicago, part 
of Aaron Director’s Free Market Study. Besides Director, O.H. Brownlee and Milton Friedman 
were closely involved with supervising it. It was published by The University of Chicago Press 
in 1951.3 In the 1950s the book was explicitly understood as belonging to the “Chicago School” 
(Dow and Abernathy 1963).4 
 
By articulating the content, context, and reception of Nutter’s monograph, this paper discusses 
four larger themes. First, I introduce the importance of Kuhnian conceptions of science to the 
methodological and institutional understanding of economics in the development of a ‘Chicago’ 
school of economics. While Thomas Kuhn was widely read and adopted in the social sciences 
and humanities in the 1960s and 70s (and thereafter), I argue that at ‘Chicago,’ proto-Kuhnian 
language can be found going back to the 1940s; in those early days it is partly used to disparage 
the achievements of economic theorizing as promoted by others. A more self-congratulatory 
Kuhnian self-understanding of economics as a mature paradigm starts to get adopted around 
1955 by George Stigler. One important new claim is that the later Kuhnian language gets 
 
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Material of this paper has been presented at the Amsterdam-Cachan workshop (2007), the Summer Institute for the 
Preservation of the History of Economic Thought at the University of Richmond (2009), a session sponsored by 
HES at ASSA, San Francisco (2009), where Professor M. June Flanders offered many comments, and the 
“Revisiting Chicago Economics” conference at Notre Dame, where many of my fellow, more knowledgeable 
participants provided extremely helpful insights and suggestions. David M. Levy called my attention to the Kuhn-
Stigler correspondence and encouraged me to consider Nutter as a research topic worthy of interest.  I am also 
especially grateful to Dan Hammond, Roger Backhouse, Spencer Banzhaf, and the editors of this volume for their 
diligent and encouraging comments on the penultimate, but by no means polished draft of this paper.

Nutter (1923-1979) is an understudied character. Among economists he is probably best known for his founding 
role in the Virginia School with its influence on public choice and law and economics; he was also a leading expert 
on Soviet economy— against naysayers from all political angles together with (my old teacher at Tufts University) 
Franklyn D. Holtzman, he insisted that Soviet economic and military strength was vastly overestimated by the CIA 
(and the Soviets). More surprising, perhaps (if we forget Frank Knight’s influence on Nutter), Nutter was strongly 
suspicious of economic imperialism; he believed in the reality of institutions; he was an early pioneer of analyzing 
path dependency in economics; Nutter was deeply suspicious of claims of value-neutrality in economics. As under-
secretary of defense, he also was a strong critic of Kissinger’s foreign policy, which he thought deeply romantic and 
dangerous. While I surmise he was on the wrong side of history when it came to Civil Rights issues, he is a 
remarkably independent thinker that played a surprisingly important role in shaping the ideological contours of the 
Goldwater/Nixon Republican party. A useful introduction to his views can be found in the essays collected in Nutter 
1983.

It was later rewritten with Richard Einhorn and extended (published in 1969). Further study is needed in evaluating 
the changes between the editions.
4
 Building on Chamberlin and Bronfenbrenner, they write: “Frank H. Knight, Milton Friedman, and George J. 
Stigler have been assigned the role of the "intellectual leaders" of the School, while the late Henry C. Simons has 
been referred to as its publicist. Other members include Aaron Director, G. Warren Nutter, Lloyd W. Mints, Harry 
Henig, Arnold C. Harberger, Simon Rottenberg, and Alfred Sherrard.” (235) In their notes they cite Nutter 1951. 

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adopted in part to divest ‘Chicago’ from its shared roots with Institutionalist economics. So, this 
paper contributes to a better understanding of the formation of a shared narrative at ‘Chicago.’ 
 
Second, I introduce contextual themes from Milton Friedman’s writings in the late 40s and 50s to 
help us understand the nature of realism at Chicago. Nutter’s dissertation helps in reading and 
illuminating Milton Friedman’s famous 1953 methodology paper (hereafter F1953) in historical 
and intellectual context. (See Schliesser 2005 and Schliesser in press; this explains my focus on 
the 1951 edition and my neglect of later editions.)  
 
Third, while this chapter notes some of the political ramifications of Chicago economics, my 
main aim is to help explain the manner in which Chicago attempted to chart a distinctive 
methodological course. This methodology has often been described as Marshallian with debts to 
the large-scale NBER studies. Rather than going over familiar territory, I call attention to the 
importance of proxies in Nutter’s empirical methodology. It is an unappreciated feature of the 
inductive, quantitative method that focused on the component structures of the economy that 
characterizes Chicago’s methodological outlook in this period. I show this by comparing 
Nutter’s dissertation to work done by Stigler, then at Columbia. We know from Stigler’s 
correspondence with Friedman that in this period they discussed methodological matters. What is 
less well known is that Friedman is explicitly credited for Stigler’s methodological insights in 
Stigler 1949. The fifth lecture, “Competition in the United States,” covers similar territory as 
Nutter’s project (this was noted by Fabricant 1953). Comparing the work by Stigler and Nutter 
sheds light on the nature of Chicago methodology as it was being developed away from 
foundations laid by Frank Knight and Henry Simons (both acknowledged as the source of 
Nutter’s “general outlook” in his acknowledgments) in the late 1940s and 1950s. I present my 
analysis through the published critical reception of both works among economists. 
 
A fourth reason to focus on Nutter’s dissertation is that it was featured in a Fortune magazine 
article in January 1952. So, it provides a useful entry into how politically important ‘Chicago’ 
research was marketed to a wider audience. This connects to issues explored by Phil Mirowski 
and his students, Rob van Horn and Eddie Nik-kah. Nutter dissertation was later often cited in 
polemical work by Aaron Director, Ed Levi, and Milton Friedman (Van Horn forthcoming). So, 
Nutter’s dissertation can help us see how ‘sponsored’ research looks at ‘Chicago at the time. This 
is especially important because Mirowski and Van Horn have claimed that Director’s Free 
Market Study group promoted a change from classically liberal views on monopoly, which 
condemned labor and employer monopolies, to a more pro-business stance. 
 
 
Section 1: The Construction of the Chicago “paradigm” 
 
Before I focus more narrowly on Nutter’s dissertation, in this section I describe the continuity in 
the manner in which the scientific nature of economics is described at Chicago. The cluster of 
views that are prevalent at Chicago from the 1940s onward are remarkably similar to those made 
famous by Thomas Kuhn. So, for the sake of brevity, I call these views ‘Kuhnian.’ In fact, I 
provide evidence that George Stigler enthusiastically welcomed the publication of Kuhn’s 
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Structure and that he called attention to the similarity of Kuhn’s views to those developed by 
Milton Friedman at Chicago.  
 
Nevertheless, I argue that there was an important change in the deployment of this proto-
Kuhnian language at Chicago: around 1955 there was a profound shift in the conception of 
economics from immature to mature science.  In particular, there was a hardening of attitudes 
toward institutionalist competitors, which in many respects were closest in outlook to Chicago 
economics (see Stapleford, this volume). Stigler’s historical and methodological work reflect 
these changes, including the construction of a narrative in which institutionalists’ concerns 
increasingly came to be seen as not belonging to economics at all.  
 
Nutter does not figure prominently in this section, but I show that Nutter and Milton Friedman 
embraced views that were (implicitly) targeted in Stigler’s new narrative framework. Moreover, 
in section 3 I show that the kind of empirical work done by Nutter (and Stigler) in the 40s can be 
best described as engaging institutionalist economists with methods and tools very familiar to 
leading institutionalist economists of the day. This work was warmly welcomed by leading 
NBER economists. Of course, some institutionalist commentators did recognize that in practice 
‘Chicago’ was ignoring certain questions and approaches off-limits. But as I show much of their 
criticism was internal to Chicago projects. So, the point of this first section is to claim that in 
effectively dissociating Chicago economics from institutionalism part of its own history becomes 
less easy to recognize. 
 
This section consists of four parts. First, I provide evidence of the routine use of Kuhnian 
language in the self-conception of Chicago. Second, I call attention to two theses about the 
disciplinary autonomy of economics associated with Stigler’s attempt to fashion a historical and 
conceptual narrative that promotes a more assertive self-understanding for economic science. 
Third, in particular, I show that Stigler attacks the view that economic problems and ideas are 
influenced by current events.  Finally, I show that the function of Kuhnian language has evolved. 
For I argue that until around 1955 Kuhnian themes (avant la lettre) were used to show that 
economic science was immature.  
 
 
1A: Kuhnian Paradigms at Chicago 
 
I start my treatment with Melvin Reder’s well known, influential 1982 retrospective essay, 
“Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change.” One is immediately struck by the Kuhnian 
rhetoric that shows up in the paper: For example, Reder writes, “Chicago economics is a 
scientific sub-culture in the Kuhnian sense, and spoken of the “Chicago Paradigm” (or family of 
paradigms), or the “Chicago Scientific Research Program”…” (19); see also his claims that 
“Chicago-type innovations are “paradigm preserving” or “paradigm extending” rather than 
“paradigm shattering,” (22; see also his use of “normal science,” at 20).  
  
In Reder’s story Milton Friedman plays the crucial role in establishing a paradigm within 
Chicago; as he writes: “Being conscripted as his interpreters had the effect, in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, of making all Chicago economics appear to be dominated by Friedman and, I 
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suspect, had the further effect of bringing them much closer to his views than they would 
otherwise have come” (Reder, 32).  
 
Given the central importance of Friedman to Reder’s story, one should not be surprised by the 
fact that this Kuhnian language even shows up completely unselfconsciously in Friedman’s 1976 
Nobel lecture: “One consequence from the Keynesian revolution in the 1930s,” (Friedman 1992 
[1976]: 282). As the reference to Keynes suggests, this language of “revolutions” was also used 
in the context of the reception of Keynes’ General Theory (Klein 1947). Proto-Kuhnian ideas 
were quite prevalent in reflection on methodology and structure of theories within the social 
sciences in the first half of the twentieth century (Backhouse 2006).5  
 
The language of revolution and even incommensurability can be traced back well before the 
publication of Kuhn’s Structure to the 1940s in Friedman’s writings. For example, in his one 
major contribution to the history of economics, the 1955 piece on Leon Walras: “It is hard now 
for us to understand why this marginal utility analysis should have been regarded as so vital and 
revolutionary. We can repeat the formulae of the histories of economic thought that it gave a 
meaningful solution to the diamond-water paradox and so permitted demand to be assigned its 
proper role and the shackles of the cost of production or…labor theory of value to be 
overthrown…I do not believe such formulae carry real  conviction or understanding. Partly, this 
is for the usual reason that an error once pointed out, seems obvious to those who never held it, 
though simply pointing it out did not make it obvious to those who had the error imbedded in the 
fabric of their thought. But I suspect the main reason is quite different, namely, that change in 
our general philosophical and methodological outlook that has been wrought, though by no 
means directly, by the developments in physical science, in particular by the replacement of the 
physics of Newton by the physics of Einstein. Surely this is why a chapter title like that of 
Lesson 10, “Rarete, the Cause of Value in Exchange,” strikes us as an anachronism” (Friedman 
1955: 902). These are not isolated features of Friedman’s thought. For example, in his famous 
1953 methodology paper he emphasizes the “tenacity with which hypotheses are held,” and why 
evidence is often so hard to document (F1953: 23). 
 
This Kuhnian language is also to be found in Stigler long before the appearance of Structure. For 
example, in the fourth lecture of his Five lectures on Economic Problems, Stigler Writs: “History 
is another eminent resource of the economist, but we have all revolted against historical 
economics” (38). See also his claim “Unless a science is thoroughly shaken up from time to time, 
its practitioners tend to become a spiritless and stultifying lot” (Stigler 1960: 301).6  
 
Evidently proto-Kuhnian language has a long history within Chicago.7 What is the meaning of 
this? Now one thing we learn from Kuhn is that sciences with paradigms do not merely discard 
 
5
 See also Parsons 1938: 5, where pre-Keynesian developments are described. Parsons was closely studied by 
Stigler (Schliesser forthcoming). 
6
 This was one of the five papers that Stigler sent to Kuhn after Structure appeared. 

Not just at Chicago, of course. As I noted above proto-Kuhnian ideas were debated throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century within and at the margins of economic thought. 
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history of their own development but also create mythic history.8  We see such mythic history 
tacitly at work in Reder’s account. In discussing the precursors to Friedman, Stigler, Becker, and 
Lucas, Reder needs to deal with the Chicago department of the 1930s. He writes: “…some of 
whom were men of great distinction, were hardly Chicago economists—or economists at all—in 
the current sense of the term.* They represent the institutionalist tradition in American 
economics which was still very strong in 1940. * I shall not speak further of these men [i.e., Nef, 
Wright, Leland, Millis--ES], because they had little impact upon or interest in the theoretical and 
ideological skirmishes of their colleagues,” (Reder 1982: 3).  
 
Reder is by no means alone is his assessment. Thomas Sowell, one of George Stigler’s PhD 
students, reports on one of his conversations with Stigler: “Commons…and his disciples were 
one sect in his cult and Thorstein Veblen and his disciples were another…[GJS:] “Institutional 
economics is dying out at a fantastic rate–though still not fast enough to suit me” (Sowell 1993: 
788). 
 
I call it mythic because it effaces the constructive and contrastive roles institutionalism played in 
the formation of Chicago economics. Malcolm Rutherford has already done much to show how 
indebted National Bureau research, including work done by important Chicago figures, was to 
institutionalist economics (see Rutherford in press, Hammond unpublished ms, Stapleford this 
volume).  
 
Throughout this paper I offer further evidence for the claim that at least an important part of the 
empirical work done by ‘Chicago’ in the 40s can be best described as  engaging institutionalist 
economists with methods and tools very familiar to leading institutionalist economists of the day. 
Reder’s account is mythic because it cannot do justice to these facts. In fact, in what follows I 
argue that from the 1950s Stigler self-consciously promoted the template of Reder’s narrative. 
Friedman became Chicago’s face to the world, but the school understood him, in part, in terms 
framed by Stigler. 
 
 
IB: The Continuity and Separability Thesis 
 
In an article from 1955, Stigler argues for what we might call a “continuity” thesis: “…in the 
broad, the boundaries of the discipline have not varied much” (Stigler 1955: 36). There is no hint 
that Stigler would have excluded the institutionalists’ writings from belonging to the discipline at 
that stage. In fact, even as late as his presidential address to AEA, Stigler favorably contrasts the 
empirical methods of early American Institutionalists like Commons and Clarke over English 
Classical and neo-Classical authors, see Stigler 1965: 11, although he makes sure to exclude the 
“denunciations of theory by the American Institutionalists” from being responsible for the 
“demonstrated successes of the pioneers of the quantitative method-the Jevons, the Mitchells, the 
Moores, the Fishers,” 16). 
 
 
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 See Kuhn 1996: 136-43. For more discussion of this see Schliesser 2008. 
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Moreover, in the same 1955 article Stigler forcefully argued for a distinctness of economics from 
psychology: “…[Adam] Smith’s professional work on psychology…bears scarcely any 
relationship to his economics, and this tradition of independence of economics from psychology 
has persisted,” (Stigler 1955: 44). I call this a “separability” thesis. Economics is autonomous 
from other sciences, especially psychology.9 
 
This concern with the continuity and separability theses also shows up in Stigler’s 
correspondence with Friedman: 
“1. After a theory has been developed and tested and much used, its applicability to certain 
classes of problems becomes established. These classes of problems may be completely specific 
or objective as in the use of engineering formulas. Or they may be more loosely specified.  
2. At all times there will also be many questions that do not clearly fall within or without the 
domain of the theory, and only further experiment can tell us whether a given problem should be 
handled by a given theory. 
This distinction is perfectly inaccurate, in that even under 1 the theory will be less than perfectly 
precise, and it is also trivial, in that it says only that some things are known better than 
others…You are clearly thinking of class 2 most of the time; whereas I put more weight on class 
1. The routine work of a science falls mostly in 1; the improvement of a science in 2,” (GJ 
Stigler to M Friedman, 30 November 1952).10 Leaving aside the interesting biographical and 
psychological issues this raises, it is clear that Stigler recognizes that the kind of potentially 
revolutionary science that Friedman is engaging in may lead to re-drawing of theoretical 
boundaries. 
 
I quote from Stigler’s 1955 essay for a reason. In an hitherto unpublished letter from March 14, 
1963. Stigler contacted Kuhn shortly after Structure (1962) appeared. This is not the place to 
analyze the Stigler-Kuhn correspondence in detail or to investigate what role Stigler may have 
had in getting Kuhn’s Structure published (Stigler was on The University of Chicago Press 
oversight board in the period).11 In the correspondence Stigler shows great warmth toward 
Kuhn’s project. At one point Stigler invites Kuhn to The University of Chicago to give an 
unlimited number of Walgreen lectures (at $1,000/per lecture). Kuhn declines.  
 
In his correspondence with Kuhn, Stigler claims that much of what Kuhn had argued in Structure 
had already been pioneered by Stigler and Friedman. There is some (although by no means 
complete) truth to this. Stigler includes five of his papers as supporting evidence for this claim. 
One of these is the 1955 Economica paper. 
 
Now in Stigler’s letter to Kuhn he raises a dilemma for Kuhn: if ‘revolutions’ are only 
“displacements” then “many of Kuhn’s statements are tautologies;” if revolutions are extensions 
of methods then it is “not true…that any large part of the previous paradigm was replaced, for a 
more or less comfortable reconciliation was achieved after a period of time….It is part of a 
 
9
  Backhouse and Fontaine 2010 argue that among the social sciences economics was the exception in resisting 
psychology’s foundational claims. 
10
 All my quotes from the correspondence between Stigler and Friedman are from Hammond and Hammond 2006.
11
 I will tell the larger story in Schliesser Unpublished ms.   
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theory’s formulation that it have a domain. The theory can be applied to problems of a type to 
which it has been applied before, or it isn’t a theory, and it need not answer questions outside the 
domain.” The second fork of Stigler’s dilemma (to which he inclines) is required for Stigler’s 
continuity thesis for economics. This is all to say, Stigler has very clearly thought through what 
the continuity (and distinctness) thesis entails. In the next sub-section I show that Stigler’s 
continuity and separability theses are developed in opposition to both institutionalism and fellow 
Chicago-economists. 
 
 
IC: Against the “Environmental Theory” 
 
In the 1955 Economica paper, Stigler is keen on attacking the historicist claim that economic 
theorizing is influenced by current social events. Stigler calls it the “environmental theory.” Now 
the only two named opponents in Stigler’s piece are the historian of economics (and sociologist 
of knowledge) W. Stark and Wesley Mitchell, one of the leading institutionalists of the previous 
generation (who had died in 1948) and one of Friedman’s mentors at NBER. So, at least in 1955 
Stigler still thinks the institutionalists are worth engaging with, even though he is arguing against 
them.12  
 
In response to the “environmental theory,” Stigler develops an opposing historical narrative: 
“Beginning with the Physiocrats, economics began to be cultivated increasingly by scholars, and 
scholarly values such as consistency, generality, precision, and elegance began to be introduced. 
In the period of the classical economics, this disciplinary aspect of economic study became 
increasingly more prominent. Hume, Smith, Malthus, Senior, Whately, Longfield, and Cournot 
all had scholarly, and usually academic, orientations towards economics, and after 1870 this 
orientation became, not merely dominant, but well-nigh exclusive. Thus it is a sign of the 
maturity of a discipline that its main problems are not drawn from immediate, changing events.” 
The last line is really remarkable in anticipating Kuhnian language.  
 
In his response to Stigler, Kuhn singles out this aspect of Stigler’s argument against the 
“environmental theory” as in accord with his own views. Kuhn writes (implying he had Stigler’s 
papers), “I invariably point to just the characteristics of the discipline that you emphasize so 
often in the articles you have sent me.  The relative immunity to external changes is one of 
these,” (Kuhn to Stigler October 24, 1963).13 
 
So, we see Stigler constructing a Kuhnian, mythic history of his own discipline with a continuity 
and separability thesis. I call it mythic because Stigler was undoubtedly aware that in Hume and 
 
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 The passage that I quoted from Sowell’s memorial to Stigler, starts with “The once widespread assumption that 
changing theories reflected contemporaneous events was part of a more general school of thought-half economics, 
half sociology, and all mush-known as "institutional economics."” 
13
 The correspondence can be found in the George Stigler Papers at The University of Chicago. I thank Stephen 
Stigler for permission in accessing these. 
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Smith the economic theory is founded on a theory of the passions;14 not to mention that Stigler 
once quoted Talcott Parson’s analysis of the philosophical presuppositions of Marshall 
approvingly—of course, Parson’s main point in his interpretation of Marshall is that Marshall 
was committed to a moral-psychological ideal that influenced how Marshall thought of 
progress.15 
 
There may be also significant unnamed targets for Stigler’s criticism because we have seen that 
in the passage from Friedman’s piece on Walras (also from 1955), Friedman toys with an 
intellectualized version of the environmental thesis.16 (Recall: changes in physics influence 
changes in economics.) This is indicative of Friedman’s own Institutionalist heritage. Friedman 
is not the only person at Chicago embracing the environmental thesis. In “Is Competition 
Decreasing in Our Economy?” (1954), Warren Nutter, too, uses an “environmental theory” to 
explain the popularity of the decline-competition-thesis during the Great Depression: “The 
thirties were a time ripe for acceptance of any simple explanation of what seemed then to be a 
catastrophe of indefinite duration…it was natural for [the economist] to look to monopoly, 
among other things, as the villain of the piece,” (quoted from Nutter 1983: 73).  
 
In the 1951 book, Nutter was a bit more restrained in espousing “the environmental theory:” “A 
substantial revival of interest in the problems of market monopoly occurred in the United States 
during the 1930s. The renewed interest was reflected in the enthusiastic reception accorded to the 
Robinson and Chamberlin works on imperfect and monopolistic competition. It was also 
reflected in the increased vigor of anti-monopoly policy under the direction of Thurman Arnold. 
Developments in theory and antimonopoly policy plus searches for explanation of the depression 
stimulated the output of empirical research,” (Nutter 1951: 11). 
 
Of course, early in his career even Stigler held to a version of the “environmental theory!” I 
quote from the concluding paragraphs of Stigler’s third LSE Lecture: “therefore, the technical 
apparatus of the classical economics was best precisely in those areas, and on precisely those 
subjects, where the issues were posed by concrete problems of the day” (Stigler 1949: 35).  
 
So, Stigler’s rejection of the “environmental theory” is as much a rejection of the self-
understanding of institutionalist economics as it is of leading Chicago figures, including him. But 
Stigler does this in a series of papers constructing a historical narrative that makes it impossible 
for his students and followers to recognize the institutionalist contribution to Chicago economics. 
 
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 See, for example, Rotwein’s introduction  in Rotwein 1955. It is somewhat ironic that Stigler’s hero, Adam Smith, 
who was no stranger to constructing self-serving histories of political economy, insisted that most of the theories he 
was arguing against were drawn from the predominant interest of the times in which they were formulated (see the 
general Introduction to Wealth of Nations and also the Introduction to Book IV); hence the mercantile system was 
drawn from the mercantile class; the agricultural, or physiocratic system from landed interests, etc.  

Stigler writes in his study of Alfred Marshall, “No attempt will be made to discuss the numerous commentaries 
[on Marshall]…there is no need to reproduce Parsons’ path-breaking analysis of Marshall’s philosophical 
preconceptions and their influence on his doctrines.” (Stigler 1941: 61-2). Stigler cites Parson’s early articles on 
Marshall from the Quarterly Journal of Economics not Structure.
16
 We know that Friedman and Stigler exchanged papers for comment, but I cannot prove this in each instance. 
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It also makes it very hard to recognize that in the 40s and 50s, Chicago’s stance toward 
instituionalism, while critical, was not as hostile as it became in Sowell’s recollections of Stigler. 
But the reason for this lack of hostility is quite surprising: in the 1940s ‘Chicago’ claimed that 
economics was by no means a mature science—one might say that Milton Friedman thought 
economics was still in its pre-paradigmatic phase. Or so I argue now. 
 
 
1D: The immaturity of Economic Science 
 
While from circa 1955 onward Stigler was inclined to argue that economics was a mature 
science, this was not the prevailing rhetoric at ‘Chicago’ in the 40s and 50. For example Stigler’s 
stance in the fourth of the Five Lectures at LSE was quite deflationary: “Economics is still a 
primitive discipline as compared with the more advanced of the natural sciences in that it 
possesses relatively few tested uniformities of economic phenomena. This primitive state is 
revealed by the lack of specificity and of accuracy of economic predictions. The chief reason for 
economics’ undeveloped state are the objective study of economic phenomena began relatively 
recently, and the phenomena to be explained are in their totality very complicated. In the present 
early stage of economic study, the economists as scientist must be largely occupied with the 
isolation of these uniformities in his subject matter. This view has implications for the type of 
research that is most urgently needed, but it has none for the impossible choice between 
“deduction” and “induction”. Until we possess many uniformities, we cannot erect broad 
analytical systems which are likely to be illuminating in the areas where uniformities have not 
yet been isolated. This is true because it is a variety of uniformities calling for systematization 
that gives rise to a useful analytical system; with only a few uniformities, too many plausible (but 
vague and conflicting) generalizations are a hand…The economist as a scientist is where the 
physicist was when he was discovering the properties of the lever, not at the stage when he was 
discovering the laws of motion,” (Stigler 1949: 41). Stigler has no doubt that economics is still 
immature. For him this means that economists should try to isolate stable economic regularities 
(phenomena) that can be the foundation for future economic theorizing. 
 
Again, this is by no means a view exclusive to Stigler. We find very similar sentiments in Milton 
Friedman’s referee report about the Cowles commission to the Rockefeller foundation:   “we 
someday hope to have a general theory of economic fluctuations…. a general model must be 
based on precise tested knowledge of the behavior of component segments of the economy, on a 
reasonably exact and comprehensive knowledge of the phenomena generalized. In the absence of 
such knowledge, there will be such a wide variety of general models capable of explaining the 
limited number of observed phenomena that it will not be possible to choose rationally among 
them…it will take decades of careful monographic work in constructing foundations before we 
shall be ready to put up the kind of superstructure that the Cowles commission hope to create full 
blown…The Cowles commission staff itself includes… able people who have an almost 
religious belief in the unique correctness of their approach…. Almost without exception, the 
people listed are primarily mathematicians or statisticians rather than economists and have had 
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no occasion to do careful scientific quantitative work on a limited segment of the economy…” 
(Friedman, May 26 1948; Rockefeller Archives).17 
 
Thus, in the late 1940s Friedman and Stigler are united in the claim that economics is by no 
means a mature science. Both insist that this is due to a lack of adequate generalizations that can 
provide a robust analytical core that can generate further generalizations. In the absence of this, 
any number of theories can explain the same data; what’s more without such robust core there 
will be no rational way of choosing among possible alternatives. (Stigler and Friedman are here 
inching up toward a statement of what is known among philosophers as the Quine-Duhem thesis, 
more about which in section 3C below.)  
 
So, in the 1940s, Chicago types are claiming that the maturity of economics as a science is a long 
way off—requiring a lot of empirical, “quantitative work” about the component segments of the 
economy, that is, to establish Marshallian demand. Without the benefit of this archival material 
(nor drawing on Stigler), Daniel Hammond (1996) and Kevin Hoover (2004) have rightly called 
attention to the deep Marshallian roots of Friedman’s methodological claims in the famous 1953 
paper. So I am not going to discuss their provenance further here. But in these quotes note a 
tantalizing bit of evidence for my claim about the changing self-understanding of “Chicago” in 
this period. In 1949 Stigler is still comparing the status of economics with that of the (pre-
Galilean) scientific knowledge of the “law of the lever.” By contrast, by 1953 Friedman is 
confident in comparing economics to the Galilean law of Fall. (F1953, 16-19; he returns to the 
example elsewhere in the paper at 24, 36). That is, economics is very close to discovering its 
equivalent to the laws of motion.18  
 
In his Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, Stigler can confidently state 
that economics is undergoing a “scientific revolution of the very first magnitude--indeed I 
consider the so-called theoretical revolutions of a Ricardo, a Jevons, or a Keynes to have been 
minor revisions compared to the vast implications of the growing insistence upon quantification. 
I am convinced that economics is finally at the threshold of its golden age--nay, we already have 
one foot through the door,” (Stigler 1965: 17). 
 
So, without wishing to claim exactitude for these dates, in the early 1950s ‘Chicago’ changed its 
tune from a Knight-ian skepticism about the status of economics as an empirical science. While 
maintaining Kuhnian language, it shifted its conception of economics from immature to mature 
science.19 With the departure of Knight-ian caution came a hardening of attitudes toward 
institutionalist competitors, which in many respects were closest in outlook to Chicago 
 
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 I thank Marcel Boumans for calling my attention to it. 
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 For more on the philosophic significance of this, see Schliesser (2005). Of course, Friedman is not the first to 
offer such analogies; as Roger Backhouse pointed out to me it also shows up, for example, in the Koopmans-Vining 
debates over measurement (Koopmans 1947 and 1949; Vining 1949a and 1949b) or Robbins 1945. Incidentally, 
Vining was also a Chicago PhD and a colleague of Nutter at Virginia.  See Brady 2007.  
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economics. One central reason for the rejection of the Institutionalist economics was its 
commitment to the (historicist) environmental theory of economics. Stigler’s historical and 
methodological work reflect these changes, including the construction of a narrativ11e in which 
institutionalists’ concerns increasingly came to be seen as not belonging to economics at all.  
 
Before I turn to the details of Nutter’s dissertation and Stigler’s argument in his fifth LSE lecture 
both directly engaging institutionalist arguments, I wish to clarify something about Friedman’s 
methodology. 
 
 
2: Friedman’s Methodology 
 
In order to understand and evaluate the methodology of Nutter’s research, we need to remove a 
persistent misinterpretation of Chicago methodology. For a variety of reasons Friedman’s 
famous 1953 methodology essay was read as advocating instrumentalism in economics.  Now 
while this understanding of Chicago methodology post Becker-Stigler 1976 might be justified, 
this once standard reading of F1953 is mistaken. Others before me, notably Kevin Hoover, have 
already argued that as a straightforward reading of the paper, attributing instrumentalism to 
Friedman is problematic.20 I read Friedman’s essay as setting out a realist methodology that is 
meant to contrast favorably with multiple targets: i) what he calls Walrasian (general 
equilibrium) theory; ii) the econometrics of the Cowles Commission; iii) Monopolistic 
competition theory as espoused by Robinson and Chamberlin. (Many of his targets combine 
these, of course.)21 What Friedman objected to was an insistence on psychological realism.  
 
But rather than arguing the case here, I want to call attention to features of Friedman’s 
methodology that are tangential to the realism-instrumentalism debate and that tend to get 
ignored if we focus on it. 
 
First, I quote again from Friedman’s referee report to the Rockefeller foundation about the 
Cowles’ commission: “I have no confidence in [Koopman’s] judgment about realistic economic 
problems or about techniques for attaining sound knowledge of economic processes” (Friedman, 
May 26 1948). It is clear that for Friedman economic theory should allow the theorist to get a 
grip on significant economic phenomena. Stigler writes Friedman: “I am coming to believe that 
you are more consistently abstract and a priori-ish than I. But it’s cloaked over by your emphasis 
on realism,” (19 August,1946).22 As should be clear, Friedman was known for emphasizing the 
application of economic (price) theory to real problems. Stigler, too, argued this in a letter to 
Chamberlin: “as if my task is to do justice to theories instead of to reality… I am prepared to 
 
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 A competing approach, defended by Mäki (1986), is that Friedman is a confused, bad philosopher. More recently 
(2009) he has come around to the realist interpretation of F1953. 
21
 For a more rounded analysis of Friedman’s immediate targets, see Hammond (2008) and Backhouse (2009). 
Backhouse draws on Friedman’s correspondence with Patenkin; it together with the unpublished drafts of F1953 
show that many characteristic views of Friedman were articulated from 1947 onward.  
22
 In responding to Patenkin, Friedman found Stigler (1947) not sufficiently concerned with empirical facts. (See 
Backhouse’s op cit. treatment of the correspondence and of Stigler 1947.  
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argue (1) that your theory is indeterminate, and (2) that it not useful (often) in realistic analysis. I 
do not recall a single consistent application of it to a real problem, and this is the ultimate failure 
of a theory” (GS to Chamberlin, 8/1947). 
 
Thus, Friedman and Stigler are against general abstract theorizing and formalizing that is too far 
removed from concrete (real) economic problems. This they associated with the Walrasian 
(general equilibrium) program. What they denied, in particular, was that one could correct the 
Walrasian program in the direction of more realism by giving it more realistic psychological 
assumptions. Stigler is very lucid on this in his critism of Triffin’s reformulation and extension 
of Chamberlin: “Dr. Triffin’s failure…seems to me attributable to his attempt to make the 
general theory an accurate description of all reality…Dr. Triffin should have been warned by the 
Walrasian theory of general equilibrium he sought to generalize…. 
“The theory [Chamberlin-Triffin] has nothing to learn from the study of specific problems 
because these problems are so diverse that no single inductive generalization is possible. 
Conversely the study of specific problems has nothing to gain from the general theory, for the 
theory can provide no apparatus to raise relevant questions, to indicate relevant type of facts, or 
to guide the economist in handling the facts to reach useful conclusions…theory is studied only 
as an aid in solving real problems, and it is good only in the measure that it performs this 
function” (Stigler 1949: 22).  
 
That is to say, ‘Chicago’ rejects a correspondence account of economic theories. The language of 
Chicago’s anti-realism is really directed at a form of naïve descriptivism, that is, the account of 
theory in which it is understood as giving a kind of photographic reproduction of reality. As 
Stigler writes, (explicitly crediting both Milton Friedman and Talcott Parsons’s The Structure of 
Social Action in an accompanying footnote): “description…is a most unreasonable burden to 
place upon a theory: the role of description is to particularize, while the role of theory is to 
generalize---to disregard an infinite number of differences and capture the important common 
element in different phenomena” (Stigler 1949: 23).23 
 
Hence, Chicago is not against theoretical generalization, as long as it can help analyze and solve 
known economic problems. ‘Chicago’ is also not against theory building. In fact, Friedman and 
Stigler often adopt the Marshallian language of theory as a research-engine. Friedman puts it 
succinctly in his criticism of Walras: “[Walras’] problem is the problem of form, not of content: 
of displaying idealized picture of the economic system, not of constructing an engine for 
analyzing concrete problems,” (Friedman 1955: 904).  
 
So, the issue is, as Stigler points out to Friedman: “It surely is possible to say something about 
assumptions being more promising than others,” (9/1948). But the development of even 
promising theory takes long hard work. By this Stigler and Friedman have in mind careful 
 
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 Stigler’s writings in the 1930s and 1940s are full of references to Parsons, and even F1953 echoes examples and 
images from Parson’s The Structure of Social Action. (Schliesser Forthcoming.) There is no evidence that Friedman 
was familiar with Parsons or Weber beyond what he read in Stigler and, perhaps, picked up from Frank Knight. But 
thanks to an interview that Daniel Hammond conducted with Rose and Milton Friedman (1989) we do know that 
Friedman was very interested in Pareto, where he would have encountered very similar ideas. 
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“quantitative” studies of “component segments of the economy, on a reasonably exact and 
comprehensive knowledge of the phenomena generalized.” I turn to Nutter’s 1951 book for a 
closer view of this method in action.  
 
 
3: Nutter’s The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 1899-1939. 
 
Nutter’s 1951 book has three short chapters and a fourth with brief “summary and 
qualifications.” It has also two longer appendices with data and graphs. The title page of the 
1951 version offers a sub-title: “A quantitative Study of Some Aspects of Monopoly.” The 
modest side of this (“some”) fits with Chicago’s self-conception in the 1940s that general theory 
will be built up out of focused inquiries. The “quantitative” element fits with the Chicago 
methodological stance of the 1940s, privileging data-driven inquiry over highly theoretical 
modeling.  
 
On p. 4 Nutter claims that the “primary purpose of the present inquiry is to study monopoly as it 
may be somehow related to economies of scale.” This vague phrasing does not do justice to 
Nutter’s aims. It is more appropriate to claim that Nutter conceives of his study as test for the 
then popular “hypothesis that monopoly is automatically generated in a private-enterprise 
system” (36). Nutter does not mention the ‘test’ early in his book, but it is hinted at from the first 
page. According to Nutter this hypothesis was stated “most uncompromisingly” by Arthur R. 
Burns in “his book, The Decline of Competition” of 1936 (1).24  
 
It is not clear to me that Nutter offers a genuine test of the “hypothesis that monopoly is 
automatically generated in a private-enterprise system” (36) if we conceive of the hypothesis as a 
ceterus paribus claim. For, Nutter offers several arguments to the effect that that increases in 
(overseas) markets and (technological) innovations may have worked against the growth of 
monopoly (29). So even by his lights ceterus is not paribus. Of course, the negative result can be 
taken to mean that the neo-classical (Marshallian) apparatus need not be given up, and can form 
the basis of future theoretical understanding.  
 
Incidentally, Nutter draws two opposite poles with on the one pole Burns and at the other pole 
Simons and Hayek (1-2).25 Rather than seeing institutionalism as non-economics beyond the 
disciplinary boundaries, Nutter understands it as one of the centers of the discipline—belying 
Reder’s later judgment and reinforcing my claim that within Chicago in the 40s and early 50s 
institutionalism was a rival to be taken seriously. 
 
Yet, from the evidence that Nutter provides Burns is committed to a weaker hypothesis: “the 
very competition that induces the most economical utilization of the means of production has 
 
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 There were two Arthur Burns. Both were on the Columbia faculty. Arthur R. Burns wrote The Decline of 
Competition. Arthur F. Burns was Friedman's mentor and Chairman of the Board of Governors. I thank Dan 
Hammond for disambiguating these for me. 
25
 The mention of Hayek suggests that at least some young, ambitious PhD students in economics were still willing 
to include him within the field even after he had become a public intellectual.
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induced the survival of firms so large and so few that perfect competition itself no longer 
survives in a number of industries” (quoted on p. 1 of Nutter). Burns does not state that 
competition always induces monopoly; not to mention that there is considerable daylight 
between the demise of perfect competition and monopoly. But let’s leave that aside.  Here I 
focus on Nutter’s self-understanding of his methodology. 
 
My aim is to analyze it so we can characterize Chicago economics in action. I focus on three 
important features: first on Nutter’s use of proxies as a way to handle limited data in complex 
environments; second on Nutter’s self-limitation about what can be investigated through 
economic analysis; third the practical response to the skeptical threat posed by the Duhem-Quine 
problem shared by Nutter and Friedman. As will be clear in what follows all three features have 
non-trivial political consequences. 
 
 
 
3A: From Defeatism to the use of Proxies: on Indirect Evidence 
 
While Nutter’s book reads as a test of a claim about the development of monopoly by private 
enterprise, the concrete aim of Nutter’s study is “to develop a meaningful quantitative index of 
the extent and growth of monopoly” (Nutter 1951: 4). Nutter is, thus, not in the business of 
developing new theory or offering an empirical study in order to improve theory. Rather he 
designs a theoretically informed measure to track a politically important economic institution. 
There is, in fact, in Nutter’s book no direct theoretical pay-off, except in so far as he undermines 
the claim that increasing returns automatically lead to monopoly. 
 
Nutter’s data driven approach is designed to create an index that can help one track changes over 
time in the nature of monopoly within an industry and the economy as a whole. It is, thus, as 
much a contribution to economic history and economic theory (see Fabricant 1953: 94). This fits 
the general character of NBER inspired work done by Friedman throughout his life.26  
 
Nutter is explicitly reacting to a certain kind of defeatism about the very possibility of empirical 
measures of competition and monopoly. He quotes Clair Wilcox as a “representative of that 
attitude: “No sort of an estimate concerning the comparative extent of competition and monopoly 
in American markets is justified by the available evidence. Such an estimate must wait upon the 
articulation of usable definitions, the development of techniques of measurement, and the 
collection of a body of data much larger than anything that is now at hand. Indeed, it may be 
doubted if such an estimate can ever be made with any assurance”” (Nutter [quoting Wilcox] 
1951: 3).  No doubt it is claims like this that Friedman and Stigler have in mind when they 
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 “[T]he Chicago School economists have traditionally worked with long-period analysis,” (Dow and Abernathy : 
240). Dow and Abernathy also focus on methodology and read Stigler 1949, F1953, and Nutter 1951s in light of 
each other and call attention to many methodological parallels among them. (I only learned of their work as I was 
putting finishing touches on this essay.) Unfortunately, they show no interest in analyzing the way in which 
‘Chicago’ handles data. Rather, they focus critically on the (lack of) rules in model selection in the analysis of data 
at Chicago. Here I am agnostic about their claim. 
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consider the “immature” aspects of economics. Yet, Nutter’s book is meant to contribute to the 
process of evolving economics from an immature and mature science. 
 
In response to Wilcox, Nutter concedes that “some arbitrariness is involved in all definition” 
(Nutter 1951: 4). But in argument later made familiar by Friedman, he continues: “The primary 
objectives of a particular inquire will dictate the way in which [definitional] lines will be drawn.”  
That is, the “meaning of [definition] chosen will depend primarily on the particular set of social 
problems that the investigator is interested in it. Recall that for Friedman a theory has several 
components: a) a tautological “language,” which serves as a “filing system for organizing 
empirical material and facilitating our understanding of it”; this filing system comes with b) 
“criteria by which it is to be judged…appropriate to a filing system. Are the categories clearly 
and precisely defined? Are they exhaustive? [etc]”; and c) a “body of substantive hypotheses 
designed to abstract essential features of complex reality” (F1953, 7). The main question for 
Friedman to be asked about these distinctions is: do the “categories of the ‘analytical filing 
system’ have a meaningful empirical counterpart, that is, whether they are useful in analyzing a 
particular class of concrete problems” (F1953, 7, my emphasis).  
 
With regard to defeatism, Nutter’s strategy is to accept that “accurate measurement of long-run 
elasticity of demand is impossible” (Nutter 1951: 7).27 When faced with complex or “limited 
data and serious conceptual difficulties” (8) many scientists create models. This has been studied 
quite intensely recently by historians and philosophers of science (see, e.g., Boumans 2005). Yet, 
Nutter’s work (and also Friedman’s work on Monetary History) reminds us of alternative 
strategies. Instead of modeling, Nutter relies on what he calls “indirect evidence” (8).28 The 
technical term for this (among philosophers) is ‘proxy’ evidence. The use of proxies has been 
less studied in the philosophy of science.  
 
In practice, Nutter will derive indirect evidence from the study of “the structure of industries—in 
terms of number of firms, concentration of output, and so on” (8). Of course, Nutter realizes that 
this must involve considerable “practical judgment” (8; Nutter puts scare-quotes around this 
phrase. Friedman also calls attention to the importance of the practitioner’s judgment in F1953, 
(25).)  Besides the use of good judgment, the employment of indirect evidence is constrained if 
other “types of evidence strongly contradict the structural evidence” (8). So, the use of proxies 
involves considerable evidential risks. 
 
Interestingly, Stigler had confronted the same problem in his fifth LSE lecture, “Competition in 
the United States.” Stigler is forthright about the problem, too: “the dividing line between 
competition and monopoly is not only subjective, which is to be expected, but also has a drastic 
effect on the proportion of industries classified as monopolies” (47).  
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 “Demand elasticity provides an asymmetrical test [of monopoly and collusion]. A high elasticity, in the absence of 
effective collusion, is a sufficient condition for competitive behavior; a low elasticity is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for competitive behavior” (Nutter 1951: 7).  
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In fact, Nutter’s fiercest critic, Stanley Lebergott, exploited this fact. On Lebergott’s analysis, if 
we change the classification of only a few industries, Nutter’s results are reversed: Suppose, 
however, that we define the industry consistently - either as monopolized or "potentially 
'workably competitive"' at both dates. The result is spectacular: monopoly now increases clearly 
and substantially (Lebergott 1953: 350). This drew a rebuttal by Nutter: “Although estimates of 
concentration at the turn of the century are subject to serious question to say the least, there is no 
reason to presume that the net bias is toward overstatement. For each case of alleged 
overstatement cited by Mr. Lebergott, there may be an equivalent understatement,” (Nutter 1953: 
352).29  
 
Of course, the use of proxies means that one is not constructing “an economic measure that 
conforms in all important respects with the best measure that can be conceived. We must usually 
be satisfied with a measure that is the best of those that can be constructed, being careful at the 
same time to interpret the measure with caution,” (Nutter 1951: 10; see also his “extreme 
caution” at Nutter 1951: 47). This is why when Nutter sums up his own conclusions, he writes 
these “are all subject to serious qualification which result from probable inaccuracies in 
measurement and from the arbitrary nature of definitions of monopoly” (Nutter 1951: 46). But 
even Lebergott, then at work in the Bureau of the Budget, admits that “the basic monograph is a 
very detailed factual study” (Lebergott 1953: 349); while accusing Nutter of introducing 
“technical bias,” he notes “the great care and detail in Dr. Nutter's estimates,” (351).  
 
In the most serious sustained, critical engagement with Nutter’s book that I am familiar with, 
Salomon Fabricant highlights two important features of Nutter’s strategy. “First, it is clear, 
therefore, that Nutter is forced to lean heavily on concentration as the revealing characteristic, 
simply because census tabulations make it available for all industries.” (Fabricant 1953: 91) That 
is to say, Nutter’s particular proxy strategy is (sensibly) informed by the availability of data.  
 
Second, Fabricant brings out how prone to varying levels of arbitrary judgment Nutter’s index of 
structure is. He does so by cleverly comparing Nutter’s results with Stigler’s fifth LSE lecture: 
“Competition in the United States.” He introduces a table in which he compares their judgments 
on the Relative Extent of Monopoly in 1939. (The numbers reflect income originating in 
monopolized industries as a percentage of income originating in the entire group). This is 
Fabricant’s table:   
Group                                             Nutter Stigler  
Contract construction ......................  100       0  
Communication ..........................       100    100  
Public utilities ....................................100    100  
Manufacturing .....................................40      40  
Mining ............ .............. …………….26      57  
Finance ............ .............. ……………22      21  
Agriculture ................... ........ ………..11       6 
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 Long after the Nutter-Lebergott exchange, one of Nutter’s main targets, Gardiner Means, called attention to 
Lebergott’s criticism of Nutter (Means 1970).  
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 Trade .......... ............... ………………..9       9  
Services ........... .............. ……………...5      12  
Transportation ........................................3      96 
 
With a hint of mischief Fabricant comments on the table as follows: 
“Construction is treated by Nutter as monopolized because of "evidence of output 
concentration in many local markets" (p. i9); while Stigler treats it as competitive, with 
a note that "this is a classification of firms, not labor markets" (p. 58, n. d). To Nutter 
the railroads were competitive in 1939, "with the exception of facilities to some 
comparatively isolated communities" (p. 20); Stigler places them all in the monopoly 
group. Stigler treats soft-coal mining as monopolistic (because it operated under a 
compulsory cartel set up by Federal legislation), while Nutter does not. On the other 
hand, both Nutter and Stigler recognize dairy farming as a compulsory cartel and 
therefore monopolistic in nature; but Nutter over-weights it greatly by using gross value 
added in milk production as a measure of income originating, while Stigler is more 
careful. Stigler read Incomes from Independent Professional Practice, by Friedman and 
Kuznets, which led him to classify medicine as monopolistic; Nutter apparently did not-
-or got contrary advice from Friedman, under whom he studied,” (Fabricant 1953: 92).  
 
Despite these criticisms, Fabricant is very supportive of Nutter’s and Stigler’s work: “Yet, 
whatever the outcome, the essential validity of their conclusion must stand. All the doubts that 
can be raised do not destroy, rather they support, the conclusion that there is no basis for 
believing that the economy of the United States is largely monopolistic and has been growing 
more monopolistic,” (Fabricant 1953: 93).  
 
 
3B: Economic vs Political Monopoly 
 
In this chapter I emphasize the methodological similarity between Nutter and F1953. However, I 
do not wish to overstate this. For example, in his book Nutter distinguishes the “political” and 
“economic” aspects of monopoly. “In a political or power sense, monopoly may refer to 
situations which provide a concentration of privileges or advantages in making and enforcing the 
effective rules of society. In an economic or market sense, monopoly refers to situations in the 
market that, within the existing effective framework of rules, lead to a particular pricing process” 
(Nutter 1951: 4). Nutter is explicit that his study “will be limited to market monopoly” (1951: 5). 
It appears that Nutter is relying on some kind of positive/normative distinction of the sort 
defended by Friedman in his F1953 and derived from the writings of Neville Keynes.30 Yet, 
when we read Nutter in context it is by no means obvious that his distinction can be grafted onto 
Friedman’s. This becomes clear when we focus on the response to Nutter’s research. 
 
The application of this distinction between political and economics aspects of monopoly drew 
serious fire from A.A. Berle Jr., who in 1932 had published The Modern Corporation and 
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Private Property, co-authored with Gardiner Means (who is one of Nutter’s main targets)31 in a 
comment on a 1951 piece by Morris Adelman that drew heavily on Nutter’s 1949 dissertation. 
(Nutter thought Adelman’s piece vindicated his approach; see Nutter 1956; reprinted in Nutter 
1983, note 8.) Berle argued as follows: 
 
“Depending on the definition of monopoly, Professor Nutter considered that 11.0 per 
cent of national income (on a rigid definition) or 19.3 per cent (under a broader 
definition) of national income originated in monopolistic industries in the year 1937; on 
the Department of Commerce income data the fraction of national income originating in 
monopolistic industries would be 20.6 per cent in that year, and 20.4 per cent in 1939. 
Again measured by the national income data, Nutter concluded that in 1899 17.4 per 
cent of all American national income originated in monopolistic industries, while in 
1937 11.0 per cent of the national income originated in such industries. Certain students 
have accordingly enjoyed the hope that maybe the problem did not seriously exist; 
certainly it did not need to engage governmental attention. This conclusion, particularly 
the latter part of it, is very pleasing in some quarters.  
But at this point, it would appear, the legal student and the political scientist had best go 
to work. For the question is not merely one of economic measurement. It is also one of 
net sociological and political effect. The concentration of 45 per cent of all 
manufacturing assets in the hands of 139 companies (Adelman’s conclusion), in a 
country the size of the United States, represents a vivid concentration of economic 
power by any standards. (American manufactures are, roughly, half the manufactures of 
the world” (in Edwards and Edelman 1952: 172). 
 
From the passage quoted it might seem that Berle is disagreeing with Nutter over some 
normative issue. After all, Berle decides not to attack Nutter on his factual conclusions. All he 
appears to be doing is giving different weight to a different set of facts (as found in “Adelman’s 
conclusion”). But this misreads Berle seriously; Berle is contrasting Nutter’s scientific 
credentials negatively with Adelman’s. This becomes clear from a passage just before this long 
quote. “The largest 139 manufacturing corporations,” Berle writes, “in 1947 held 45 per cent of 
the assets of all American manufacturing corporations—a large absolute increase in asset value, 
but proportionally a slight decline since 1931. This is a realistic, solid, and scientific 
appreciation of the problem as Adelman defines it. Thus, it is an improvement over a similar 
study by Dr. G. Warren Nutter, of Yale, stimulated by the University of Chicago Law School” 
(Edwards and Edelman 1952: 172; emphasis added).  
 
Thus, while Berle is not shy about calling attention to the roots of Nutter’s work in the Free 
Market Study and hints (“some quarters”) at the political agenda associated with it (something 
Adelman passes over in his piece for Fortune), Berle conceives his debate with Nutter as a 
debate within “positive” science. (After all “political science” and “law” are by his light also 
sciences! [No doubt there is a German notion of 'wissenschaft' lurking in the background here.]) 
It’s only once the institutionalist background is written out of history of economics that Berle’s 
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comment appears as a claim about normative or policy aspects of economics. In context Nutter’s 
distinction is a move within positive economics one that is challenged on scientific grounds. I 
have been unable to find a direct response to Berle by Nutter.  
 
Regardless of the substance of Berle’s criticism, the spirit of his remarks alerts us to the fact 
Nutter’s economic vs political monopoly distinction need not map on to a positive vs normative 
distinction. In fact, there is no reason to believe that Nutter thinks that political monopoly is not a 
subject appropriate to economics. It is just that he thinks the quantitative tools and indirect 
evidence available to him in his particular study cannot shed much light on it. After all, Nutter 
also claims that “in an economic or market sense, monopoly refers to situations in the market 
that, within the existing effective framework of rules, lead to a particular pricing process.” This 
emphasis on the effective framework of rules, that is the ‘political’ dimension of monopoly, is 
closer to Knight's Weberian approach (which has an important after-life in Virginia political 
economy) than Friedman's so-called positivism. But Nutter’s and Buchanan’s links to ‘Chicago’ 
of the 30s and 40s must be told elsewhere.32 
 
It is possible that Nutter’s deliberate self-limitation was driven by political motives that lurked 
behind the research and its outcomes as Berle implies. Anticipating Mirowski and his school, 
Berle clearly thinks that Nutter’s association with Director’s Free Market Study gives away the 
game. While one cannot rule out this reductive interpretation of Nutter’s approach (and 
everything I say is compatible with it), it is not the one I pursue here. One can also understand 
Nutter’s strategy in more legitimate, scientific fashion.  
 
 
3C: Duhem-Quine thesis; Nutter’s Realism 
 
Nutter is leery of applying the theory of “perfect competition” without qualification. As he writes 
in a passage that foreshadows Friedman’s famous strictures: “It is particularly misleading to 
judge productive conditions on the basis of the presence of absence of the basic formal 
assumptions of perfect competition. The theory of perfect competition, like all theories, is an 
artificial system, constructed for the purpose of analysis and prediction. As, such the simplest 
possible set of assumptions has been chosen that is consistent with the processes and results of 
that system…The purpose of simplification of assumptions is to facilitate analysis, not closely to 
approximate actual conditions,” (Nutter 1951: 6). 
 
In context, Nutter is justifying his use of a category ‘workable competition.”33 This notion was 
labeled, “Pickwickian phraseology,” by Nutter’s critic, Lebergott (1953: 350). But rather than 
investigate how Nutter attempts to operationalize this imprecise notion, 34 I focus on one more 
methodological similarity between Friedman and Nutter. For example, in the quote from page 6, 
I omitted Nutter’s claim that “It is always possible to construct alternative sets of assumptions, 
 
32
 Besides Brady 2007, see Medema and McCloskey in this volume on the links between Virginia and good old 
Chicago. 
33
 Somewhat surprisingly, Nutter does not mention Clark 1940, cited in Stigler 1949, 48-9. 
34
 In light of Backhouse (2009) of Friedman and debates over monopoly, this question merits further clarification.
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with any desired degree of complexity, equally consistent with processes and results” (Nutter 
1951: 6). This is a version of what is known among philosophers as the Duhem-Quine thesis. 
Friedman has a very nice statement of it:  “If there is one hypothesis that is consistent with the 
available evidence, there are always an infinite number that are.”* (F1953: 9); *See also “Lange 
on Price Flexibility,” 282-3.) As my earlier quotes from Stigler and Friedman indicate (section 
1D), versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis were repeated regularly around ‘Chicago.’ As the 
context of Nutter’s employment of the Duhem-Quine thesis indicates, it is meant to defend 
theoretically informed simplifications (or abstractions) to further the application of a favored 
theory to ‘real’ problems and simultaneously to prevent appeals to the realism of assumptions of 
competing theories to undermine in advance ongoing research. This is an unappreciated fact of 
Chicago methodology (see Schliesser 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
4: Coda by way of Conclusion 
 
In the conclusion of his study of Nutter’s and Stigler’s findings, Salomon Fabricant writes: “The 
start made by Nutter and Stigler is only the first in a series of approximations, as I said at the 
outset. Yet even when completed, the results could provide only a clue to the really significant 
measures of level and trend of monopoly. Nutter and Stigler recognize that monopoly is 
significant, and its importance is truly measured only by its effects. When we are concerned with 
the efficiency of the economy, what we want to ask is: By how much would real national income 
per capita be raised if monopoly were somehow eliminated-after deducting the costs of 
eliminating it? It is this question at which Nutter and Stigler are really aiming. But it is not the 
only question. If we are concerned with the rate of economic progress, what we want to ask is: 
By how much would the rate of increase of real income per capita be stepped up if monopoly 
were eliminated?” (Fabricant 1953: 93)  
 
One can understand Harberger’s much cited and influential “Monopoly and Resource 
Allocation” (1954) as an attempt to answer these questions. Harberger estimated “some 
quantitative notion of the allocative and welfare effects of monopoly” (Harberger 1954: 77) and 
concluded that the “welfare cost of monopoly in present values to $1.50 per capita, but not 
significantly higher” (Harberger 1954: 86).There is a sense in which Harberger’s results cohere 
with Stigler’s and Nutter’s. They were often cited together by critics and friends alike (Dow and 
Abernathy 1963; Arrow 1977: 389; Weintraub (1955, (although Weintraub distinguishes among 
them, too); Reder 1982: 16). But at the same time Harberger’s estimate deflates the whole issue. 
As Harberger observes, “it seems to me that our literature of the last twenty or so years reflects a 
general belief that monopoly distortions to our resources structure are much greater than they 
seem in fact to be,” (Harberger 1954: 86). This has obvious political implications (Dow and 
Abernathy: 236). 
 
Moreover, with its aggressive application of Hotelling’s formal work (including adoption of 
diagrams that focus on triangles that represent welfare loss) and its avoidance of the nitty gritty 

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empirical details of the component aspects of the economy, Harberger’s paper was also a 
significant step away from the Knightian and NBER roots at Chicago.35 Instead of careful 
empirical industry-specific research, Harberger turned the question of monopoly at Chicago into 
an issue within welfare economics; his upshot is that “we can neglect monopoly elements and 
still gain a very good understanding of how our economic process works and how our resources 
are allocated,” (Harberger 1954: 87). One is now allowed to assume, in Nutter’s words, that 
“competition is the normal condition in our economy,” (Nutter 1954: 76).36 This heralds a new 
(as-if) working assumption that influences all subsequent Chicago research (Reder 1982). 
 
So far I have emphasized the methodological discontinuity between Harberger’s article and the 
work done by Nutter, Stigler, and Friedman in this period. We should not forget that Stigler had 
started his career as a critic of the new welfare economics (Stigler 1943; see Levy & Peart 2008 
and Schliesser Forthcoming). In fact, Stigler is quite critical of Harberger’s 1954 estimate, 
concluding his discussion of Harberger sarcastically: “No one knows the amount of welfare loss 
that would be found if all the appropriate modifications could be carried through. Perhaps it 
would come to only $2,000,000 a year for every economist. Whatever it may be, we may still 
properly devote much attention to monopoly,” (Stigler 1956: 35). By the time of Reder’s 
retrospective this has been long forgotten and is Chicago understood in terms of Pareto 
optimality (Reder 1982: 11ff).  
 
Of course, once Chicago accepts the new welfare economics it opens the door to social 
engineering (for a careful account of Chicago’s acceptance of the new welfare economics, see 
Banzhaf forthcoming; Harberger 1954 plays a crucial role in his narrative). This requires further 
argument, of course, but it is surely no coincidence that Harberger was the main educator of the 
Chilean “Chicago Boys.” But that story must be told elsewhere (Schliesser in press). 
 
June 16, 2010, 
Eric Schliesser, BOF Research Professor, Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, 
Ghent, Belgium. nescio2@yahoo.com 
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